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1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent observations show that European electricity market prices turn negative when high 
shares of inflexible generation hit a low demand. The increasing share of Renewable Energy 
Sources for Electricity (RES-E), such as wind and solar Photovoltaic Power (PV), is an 
important driver due to the intermittency of its energy source.1 The objective of the paper is to 
explain this phenomena of negative prices, as well as the behaviour of electricity markets with 
high shares of RES-E. 
Table 1 represents the national statistics of leading EU member states in terms of the installed 
capacities of wind and solar power by the end of 2012. In Belgium, both technologies 
accounted for 3.4% and 1.9%, respectively in terms of average electric energy penetration. 
Concerning wind power integration, lessons can be learned today from leading countries such 
as Denmark (30.0%), Portugal (20.4%), Spain (18.2%) and Ireland (15.6%). For solar power 
integration, leading countries are Italy (5.7%), Germany (5.1%) and Spain (4.3%). 
Table 1: Installed capacity (GW) and annual electricity generation (TWh) of wind and PV in selected 
European countries by the end of 2012 (based on data published by ENTSO-E 2013) [2]. 
  
wind solar (mostly PV3) 
GW TWh 
penetration [%] 
GW TWh 
penetration [%] 
 mean1 max2 mean1 max2 
Denmark 4.2 10.3 30.0 200.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 19.0 
Portugal 4.2 10.0 20.4 127.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 6.1 
Spain 22.4 48.5 18.2 126.6 6.1 11.6 4.3 34.5 
Ireland 1.6 4.0 15.6 100.0 n.a. 0.0 0.0 n.a. 
Germany 30.9 46.0 8.5 96.3 32.8 27.6 5.1 102.2 
Italy 8.1 13.3 4.1 38.6 16.4 18.6 5.7 78.1 
Belgium 1.3 2.9 3.4 21.0 2.5 1.6 1.9 40.3 
1 average electric energy penetration: annual electricity generation in terms of total consumption;  2 max 
penetration: installed capacity in terms of minimum consumption; 3 solar in Spain includes 2.0 GW 
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP). 
In terms of power ratios, these shares of variable RES-E may account for “maximum 
penetrations” exceeding 100% of the minimum demand. Table 1 shows how this may already 
be the case for wind power in Denmark (200.0%), Portugal (127.3%), Spain (126.6%) and 
Ireland (100.0%), when expressing the installed capacity relative to the minimum consumption 
level. The maximum penetration is an indicator for the need for curtailing part of the renewable 
capacity, for export or for storage. Meanwhile, the shares of RES keep on growing under the 
                                               
1 Intermittency refers to the limited controllability and partial predictability of a generation resource [1]. 
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effect of policy targets and declining investment costs. For instance in Belgium, wind power 
and PV have grown respectively up to 1.7 and 3.0 GW towards the beginning of 2014 [3].  
Historically, system operators, regulators and policy makers were mainly concerned about 
upward adequacy, i.e. the ability of power systems to meet peak demand and avoid demand 
shedding. This topic remains certainly relevant today, especially where power systems face 
decommissioning of older power plants, in countries where a nuclear phase-out is decided, 
while existing units with high marginal cost (such as gas-fired generating units) face problems 
maintaining their profitability. In combination with intermittent RES-E, this leads to an increased 
risk for periodical shortages [4]. However, attention is also needed for downward adequacy, 
i.e. the ability of the system to cope with low demand periods. Recent events have shown that 
system inflexibilities may lead to periods with excess power, challenging the operation of the 
power system. These inflexibilities include renewable generation dealing with priority dispatch 
and production support mechanisms, conventional generation facing techno-economic 
limitations in output variations, and must-run conditions of power plants for system security 
reasons.  
This issue is referred to as the “incompressibility of power systems” and is recently observed 
in Central Western European electricity markets such as Germany, France and Belgium, with 
hours showing negative electricity prices on day-ahead, intra-day and balancing markets. 
Economic theory imposes that low demand together with a large supply at nearly-zero marginal 
cost results in lower market prices. However, events with negative prices are less 
straightforward as these price levels translate into generating units which are willing to pay for 
the consumption of electrical energy. 
2 NEGATIVE DAY-AHEAD MARKET PRICES 
Figure 1 represents the theoretical framework of the impact of renewable power with low 
variable cost in day-ahead wholesale electricity markets. In this market, electricity is traded 
and positions are taken for the next day, based on market expectations. The supply curve is 
represented by a merit order of generation technologies, representing their marginal 
generation cost. Usually, but depending on the actual fuel costs, these generation technologies 
are categorised as base load (e.g. nuclear and coal-fired power plants), mid load (e.g. 
combined-cycle gas turbines) and peak load (e.g. open-cycle gas turbines, diesel engines). 
The price is set by the intersection of the demand curve and the supply curve. In Figure 1 (left), 
it is shown that the expected demand impacts the price of electricity. A low demand does not 
require the activation of the more expensive power plants and results in a lower price. 
Furthermore, when a certain injection of RES-E is predicted with an almost zero marginal cost, 
the supply curve is shifted to the right, lowering the electricity prices (Figure 1, right), referred 
to as the merit order effect. This results in price volatility as these RES-E are characterised by 
an intermittent availability. 
However, due to technical constraints of power systems, the supply curve may look different 
in reality. Certain generation technologies such as older nuclear power plants in some 
countries are not designed for short-term output variations (referred to as inflexible base load). 
Furthermore, part of the conventional power plants has to remain on-line for security reasons, 
such as providing reserve capacity, paid for by the TSO (referred to as must-run generation) 
(See Figure 2, left). This issue becomes even more important with the increasing share of 
RES-E facing prediction errors and additional reserve capacity requirements [5]. This may 
result in negative price bids, in order to guarantee the acceptance of this bid. Furthermore, 
RES which actively participate in the market, can bid negative prices due to the presence of 
support mechanisms. They are willing to generate as long as the negative electricity price is 
compensated by the production support under the form of feed-in tariffs or green certificates 
(Figure 2, right). Part of the operation of RES which is market-price insensitive due to priority 
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dispatch policies or control difficulties following its distributed generation (DG) nature, as for 
instance local PV generation in Belgium, are treated as negative demand, shifting the demand 
curve to the left (Figure 2, right). 
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Figure 1: Theoretical merit order without (left) and with renewable energy sources (right). 
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Figure 2: Practical merit order without (left) and with renewable energy sources (right); RESDG expected 
renewable generation production of distributed nature; F flexible; NF non-flexible. 
This explains how prices can turn negative when facing low demand together with high RES 
injections. It is currently observed that negative price periods on European day-ahead markets 
increase in frequency. In the last week of December 2012, a low demand in the holiday period 
together with a high wind situation resulted in negative prices on the day-ahead hourly 
electricity market for Germany and Austria (EPEX Phelix) [6]. Negative day-ahead prices down 
to -222 €/MWh were registered during the night of December 25th, and this problem reoccurred 
multiple times during the rest of that week.  
A similar event occurred in the Central Western European region, i.e. Belgium, Germany and 
France in the weekend of June 15-16, 2013 facing a regional low industrial consumption on 
Sunday, low residential consumption on mild weather, and abundant inflexible generation 
driven by wind, PV, hydro and nuclear2. In France, a daily average price of -41 €/MWh 
and  -20€/MWh (EPEX), respectively, for base and peak demand periods on the day-ahead 
market, and minima down to -200 €/MWh during the night were observed. As the day-ahead 
electricity markets of France, Germany and Belgium are coupled, these prices are buffered 
and spread over the region, constrained by the available interconnection capacity. This was, 
for instance, the case for the same weekend discussed here, where average prices in 
Germany/Austria (EPEX Phelix) fell to roughly -20 €/MWh and -3€/MWh for respectively peak 
and base demand periods, and minima down to -100 €/MWh. 
                                               
2 APX, Belpex, EPEX SPOT - Joint Statement on negative prices in Belgium and France on 16 June 2013, http://www.belpex.be/ 
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Prices also turned negative on the Belgian day-ahead market (Belpex) that same weekend as 
the price  hit a low of -200 €/MWh (Figure 3) [7]. The residual Belgian demand seen by the 
market participating generating units is low due to low demand and high RES penetration [8]. 
This demand incorporates distributed wind and PV, which is treated as negative demand. A 
minimum demand of 6.2 GW was observed on Sunday, combined with a maximum of 2.6 GW 
of wind and PV on Saturday. The negative price peaks are explained by the must-run 
conditions of conventional power plants, the available nuclear capacity of 5.4 GW, and 
constrained export capabilities.  Events where day-ahead market prices turn negative are still 
rare: in France in 2012, 56 hours with negative prices were observed in the French day-ahead 
market (EPEX), and these occurred over 15 days. In 2012 and 2013 in Belgium (Belpex), 7 
and 15 hours were observed, respectively, in both cases for 3 days. As they are linked to low 
net demand periods, such events are expected to increase in frequency.  
 
Figure 3: Belgian Day-Ahead Market Operation June 15-16 June 2013 (data: Elia System Operator and 
Belpex Power Exchange) [7], [8]. 
3 NEGATIVE INTRA-DAY MARKET PRICES 
In European power systems, market players are able to adapt their positions intra-day, based 
on updated market expectations. This is particularly useful for intermittent RES-E, relying on 
higher forecast accuracy closer to real-time. This market is well represented in European 
power exchanges, matching bids on a continuous basis. In general, intra-day markets follow 
the same economic principles as day-ahead markets, although liquidity may be lower and 
prices more volatile. This is explained by technical limitations of generating units to alter their 
injections closer to real time. A trend towards European regional market coupling is present, 
which is expected to increase market liquidity. Prices in the intra-day market are related to the 
day-ahead prices and real-time balancing-market-price expectations. 
In the case of December 25th, 2012, EPEX intra-day market prices were found to hit a low 
of -500 €/MWh in Germany/Austria [6]. Also on June 15-16th, 2013, negative prices were 
observed on Belgian, French and German intra-day markets. In the French intra-day  market 
(EPEX) in 2012, 41 hours with negative prices were observed, which occurred during 10 days. 
In the Belgian intra-day market (Belpex) in 2012 and 2013, 1 and 26 hours during 1 and 10 
days were identified, respectively [7]. It is to be noted that the intra-day market in Belgium 
remains relatively small and illiquid compared to the day-ahead market markets. 
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4 NEGATIVE BALANCING MARKET PRICES 
Real-time deviations from the scheduled market positions are dealt with on the balancing 
market. Historically, such deviations include unplanned power plant outages and unexpected 
demand variations. With the increasing penetration of intermittent RES-E, also prediction 
errors result in an additional demand for balancing actions [9]. Due to its strong relation to 
system security, this market is coordinated by the TSO. It contracts reserve capacity which is, 
today, mainly procured from conventional power plants, and can be quickly activated in real-
time to cover system imbalances. In principle, a minimum amount is contracted by means of 
long-term contracts in order to keep a minimum capacity available. Furthermore, market 
players can offer additional capacity by means of short-term contracts which are closed one 
day before the real-time. Together, this results in a merit order representing the activation cost 
of reserve capacity (Figure 4, left).  
When activating upward reserves for the situation in which the system faces an instantaneous 
power shortage (negative imbalance), this results in a positive marginal price (MP) for 
balancing, and the TSO pays the Balancing Service Provider (BSP) (Figure 4, left). This 
activation price covers, inter alia, the fuel cost of increasing the output of the power plant. In 
Belgium, upward reserve capacity is provided with different mechanisms: the system 
imbalance is netted with other control zones by means of International Grid Cooperation and 
Control (IGCC). Upward fast-response secondary reserves (R2) include contracted and 
possible free bids from power plants. The slow-response tertiary reserves (R3) contain 
contracted and free bids from power plants, contracted bids from interruptible demand, 
contracted bids from resources on the distribution level (as of 2014), and a non-guaranteed 
emergency capacity from other TSOs [10].  
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Figure 4: Bid ladders for activating reserve capacity (left): positive (negative) available reserve capacity 
represents upward (downward) reserve capacity; positive (negative) activation price represents a cash flow 
from TSO (BSP) to BSP (TSO); downward reserve capacity can be bid at both negative as positive price. 
Imbalance settlement mechanism (right): MDP marginal decremental price; MIP marginal incremental price. 
In contrast to the upward reserve, the downward activation price can be positive or negative. 
Usually, the price is negative and refers to a payment of the BSP towards the TSO. This is 
explained by the fuel savings following the output reduction of a power plant. However, market 
players may also bid positive activation prices, i.e. willing to be paid for the activation. This 
may compensate power plants facing expensive shut-down costs, or renewable power plants 
losing production support. In this case, the imbalance settlement tariff becomes negative and 
money flows represented in Figure 4 (right) are reversed. In Belgium, downward reserve 
capacity is provided by means of the IGCC mechanism, secondary reserve, free bids and inter-
TSO emergency [10].  
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The reservation and activation of reserve capacity are referred to as the procurement side of 
the balancing market, i.e. the reserve market. Reservation costs are included in the 
transmission tariffs and activation costs are transferred to the responsible market players by 
means of the imbalance settlement mechanism. In 2012, a one-price settlement system was 
introduced in Belgium (Figure 4, right). This represents the settlement side of the balancing 
market resulting in a price quoted on this market every quarter of an hour. An additional 
component is added when facing large imbalances, pulling apart the MDP and MIP price, and 
providing an additional incentive for BRPs to balance their position.  Although the price is 
unknown in real-time, estimates can be made from the real-time system imbalance, the 
available capacity and marginal price published by the TSO. Balancing Responsible Parties 
(BRPs) can actively adapt their positions in order to minimise their imbalance volume or cost. 
A first example of negative imbalance prices can be found in Germany where on February 10, 
2013, PV injections were underestimated due to melting snow. This resulted in a downward 
reserve activation and negative imbalance prices down to -218 €/MWh [11]. When studying 
time series of the Belgian imbalance tariffs for 2012 and 2013, it is found that negative prices 
are recorded 9.1% and 6.6% of the time, while minima were registered at -238 €/MWh and -313 
€/MWh, respectively [10]. An example of negative Belgian imbalance prices is found on April, 
1, 2013 (Figure 5): large negative activation prices were recorded in the day-time, indicating 
an excess of power and providing a strong market incentive to reduce injection or increase off-
take. This event is again caused by incompressibility where downward flexibility is limited in 
periods with low demand, resulting in negative pricing when facing high positive system 
imbalances.  
 
Figure 5: Imbalance settlement tariff on Belgian electricity market on April 1, 2013 [12]; POS positive BRP 
portfolio imbalance tariff (excess energy), NEG negative BRP portfolio imbalance tariff (shortage). A postive 
tariff means that the BRP with a negative imbalance pays the TSO and the BRP with positve imbalance is 
paid by the TSO. This is reversed in case of a negative tariff.  
When studying the day-ahead market (Figure 6, left), it is confirmed that expected residual 
demand is relatively low resulting in lower prices during the day. It is noticed how this coincides 
with high values of predicted RES production during the day. Part of this production, i.e. the 
injections at the distribution level, is already included in the demand. A low demand results in 
fewer power plants scheduled, or scheduled at minimum load, resulting in little or expensive 
flexibility to cope with positive forecast errors. This translates into expensive downward reserve 
capacity. But evidently, and unfortunately, a large positive imbalance is correlated with the 
demand forecast error, the RES forecast error and the final PV injections (Figure 6, right). The 
main source of this imbalance is PV is integrated in the distribution system by means of 
‘netmetering’, i.e. without direct metering of the PV injections, and therefore difficult to monitor, 
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predict or control. This issue calls for measures in order to create market participation or at 
least well-functioning prediction models. 
The large imbalance requires large amounts of downward reserve capacity to be activated 
(Figure 7). First, the imbalance is netted with the IGCC after which the available secondary 
reserve (R2) is activated. This capacity is limited to 140 MW and additional reserve capacity is 
to be activated resulting from the free bids (Bids-) and the last resort inter-TSO cooperation 
(R3). However, the free bids are limited and expensive, as downward flexibility remains limited 
due to the low demand while facing large shares of inflexible generation. This explains the 
negative imbalance settlement tariffs, resulting from the activation of large amount of 
downward reserve capacity far in the merit order. As one goes further in the merit order, 
activation prices increase, which explains the negative prices.  
  
Figure 6: Day-ahead market operation (left) and system imbalance (right) on April 1, 2013 [7], [8], [12]. 
 
Figure 7: Upward (positive) and downward (negative) regulation volume on April 1, 2013 [12]. 
5 CONCLUSION: IN NEED FOR DOWNWARD FLEXIBILITY 
The intermittency of RES translates into volatile market prices as well as negative prices during 
periods where high RES-E injections hit a low demand. In the day-ahead market, this is driven 
by expected injections, while in real-time markets, this is driven by unexpected injections due 
to prediction errors. 
There are three major reasons why one can end up with negative prices on these markets. 
First of all, high production subsidies result in a distorted price responsiveness of RES-E 
technologies, i.e. renewable generating units are willing to pay to inject power. Furthermore, a 
large part of the RES-E currently connected to the distribution system lack control capabilities 
and right market incentives to react upon negative market prices. Therefore, measures  are 
needed to improve the active market participation of renewable generation and achieve a cost-
efficiency and reliable operation of the system.  
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Second, the negative prices result from the limited flexibility of the conventional power plants. 
This may result from technological limitations such as start-up, shut-down and output ramping 
constraints. Negative prices induce flexibility on the short- and long-term by means of 
incentivising  the output control of must-run conventional generation sources, e.g. nuclear 
power, or the reduction of minimum run levels of power plants, e.g. CCGT. Furthermore, these 
negative prices may facilitate implementation of new sources of flexibility such as demand-
response or storage technologies.  
Finally, negative prices occur from must-run conditions of conventional power plants in order 
to meet system security standards. A major challenge is the increasing need of reserve 
capacity to balance the prediction errors of RES-E. It is therefore important to counter this need 
with improving forecast tools, or optimal sizing and allocation methodologies. Furthermore, it 
should be investigated how an increasing share of the reserve services can be provided with 
alternative technologies such as storage, demand response, or RES. 
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